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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 880102

vs.
Classification Priority No. 1

JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the appeal
in this matter for the reason that it is an appeal from a
conviction of a capital felony and sentence of death, to be
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court under the provisions of 78-2-2
(3) (h) and 77-35-26 (8), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT
The Defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, plead guilty in
the District Court to the capital felony, Criminal Homicide,
Murder in the First Degree, on September 18, 1987 (R. 79-86).

A

sentencing trial was held before a 12 member jury in Iron County
from January 25, 1988, through January 29, 1988.

The sentencing

procedure was conducted under the provisions of 77-3-207, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

The jury returned a unanimous

verdict for death after deliberating approximately 3 1/2 hours
(T. 1258).

The

court

granted

the

Defendant

additional

time

to present argument in support of a hearing on the applicability
of the death penalty in the case (T. 1269).

On February 17,

1988,

the

court

imposed

the

sentence

of

death

by

lethal

intravenous inj ection.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
FIFTH AMENDMENT, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES•
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
SECTION 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United State,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State,
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
No person shall be deprived
property, without due process of law.

of

life,

liberty

or

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the County or District in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband
2

against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense.
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 13, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived
by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment,
with or without such examination and commitment. The formation
of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.
76-5-202. MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
AS AMENDED.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death
of another under any of the following circumstances:
(h)
The actor was previously convicted of first or
second degree murder or of a felony involving the use or threat
of violence to a person. For the purpose of this paragraph, an
offense committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in
Utah would be punishable as first or second degree murder, is
deemed first or second degree murder.
RULE 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
RULE 404 (b), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as prove of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, RULE 3.4 (e).
In trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue
except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion
as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused.
3

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is

an

appeal

from

a

conviction

of

Criminal

Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital felony.

The

Defendant plead guilty to Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First
Degree, a capital felony, specifically pleading guilty to the
offense specified in 76-5-202

(1) (h) having intentionally or

knowingly caused the death of another and having previously been
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to
a person (R. 79-86).

The Defendant had previously plead guilty

to the offense of armed robbery which occurred in Las Vegas,
Nevada, in 1982.

Following the entry of the plea of guilty, the

Defendant elected to have sentencing determined by jury trial. A
five-day sentencing hearing was held before a jury of 12 persons,
January 25 to January 29 of 1988. The jury returned a verdict of
death, and the Fifth District Court imposed sentence accordingly.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the late afternoon of August 30, 1987, the victim,
Richard L. Ernest, left Southern California in his 1986 Dodge
Omni vehicle (T. 666) with the intention of moving to the State
of Colorado (T.662).

The Dodge Omni was packed with the victim's

tools and personal belongings to the extent that the entire rear
of the vehicle behind the front seats was filled with these items
(T. 698). The victim was a carpenter, and most of the tools were
carpenter

tools

(T. 683-688).

The

victim

picked

up

the

Defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, near Barstow, California, on
the Interstate 15 freeway.

Mr. Parsons was hitchhiking at the
4

time

(T. 1035).

The victim and Mr. Parsons traveled together

until approximately 2:00 to 3:00 a.m. on the morning of August
31, 1987 (T. 1040).
in

northern

Iron

(T. 1040).

Both

They stopped at a rest area on Interstate 15
County

known

gentlemen

as the

used

the

Lunt

Park

restroom

Rest

Area

facilities

at

the rest area and returned to the car to get some sleep (T.
1041).

While the Defendant, Parsons, was sleeping, he felt a

hand on his leg.

Mr. Parsons told the victim to leave him alone

(T. 1041-1042) . Mr. Parsons felt the hand on his leg again, and
attempted

to

leave

the

car

(T. 1042).

The

victim

grabbed

Mr. Parsons1 left wrist and Mr. Parsons stabbed the victim in the
chest, inflicting the fatal wound (To 867), at the first blow
(T. 1042-1043).

There was a struggle thereafter (T. 1043-1044)

in which the victim received a number of other, though non-fatal,
stab

wounds

(T. 861-867).

The

Defendant

drove

the

car

approximately one mile north of the rest area (T. 1045) and drove
thereafter 20 feet off of the road surface, left the victim's
body alongside the road, covering the body with a sleeping bag
(T. 1045) .

The

Defendant

then

went

on

to

Beaver,

Utah,

approximately 5 miles farther north, and pulled off the 1-15
freeway

entering

interchange
clothes

of

and

(T. 1047).

the

Beaver

washed

Dave's

Texaco

(T. 704).

the

blood

Station

The

off

of

at

Defendant
his

the
changed

hands

and

south
his
arms

The Defendant then emptied out a substantial portion

of the tools and other property from the car, dumping them in the
dumpster at the rear of the station (T. 1048) .
5

The Defendant

gassed up the car at the Dave's Texaco Station using the victim's
credit card and assuming the identity of the victim, claiming
that he was Richard L. Ernest

(T. 1050) .

The Defendant then

drove off to Richfield, Utah, where he again used the Defendant's
credit card to check into a motel (T. 1052) and buy various items
at the K Mart in Richfield (T. 1053)•

While the Defendant was at

the K Mart in Richfield, store personnel checked the status of
the credit card on a large purchase, and received word that the
credit

card

was

to

be

picked

up

(T. 760).

The

Defendant

voluntarily gave the credit card to the store personnel and left
Richfield (T. 763). The Defendant drove east from Interstate 70,
stopping at the Red Creek Rest Area east of Salina, Utah.
enforcement

officials

had

been

alerted

to

the

credit

Law
card

transactions and the Defendant's unusual activities in Beaver,
Utah

(T. 789) .

As the Defendant slept at the Red Creek Rest

Area, he was arrested by a Trooper of the Utah Highway Patrol,
and taken into custody at that time (T. 791) .
The Defendant had previously been convicted of armed
robbery in Las Vegas, Nevada, in early 1983, out of an incident
arising in November of 1982 (T. 901) .
sentenced

to

the

Nevada

State

The Defendant had been

Prison

system,

and

spent

approximately 5 years in that system before being paroled June of
1987 •

The Defendant had absconded from parole August of 1987

(T. 924), and had traveled in Nevada and California until he met
the victim on August 30, 1987.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The statute with which the Defendant was charged

and to which he plead guilty is unconstitutional for the reason
that it allows the State of Utah to use evidence of a prior
conviction in order to improperly prejudice the jury and incite
the jurors to convict on the basis of prior bad acts.

This

statute forced the Defendant to plead guilty because of the ease
of the State's proof and the fear of a psychological momentum
building within the jury to favor the death penalty.
2.

By preparing specific findings only on the issues

of aggravating circumstances, the jury was improperly mislead to
the conclusion that it only found aggravating circumstances and
there were no mitigating circumstances to mitigate against the
imposition of the death penalty.
3.

The Defendant was improperly denied the ability to

present evidence to the court indicating that the imposition of
the death penalty in his case at his prosecution for a capital
crime was arbitrarily and capriciously undertaken by the State of
Utah.
4.

The

trial

court

improperly

intervened

in

the

proceedings by assisting the State of Utah and advising the
State's prosecutor that he should withdraw a Motion for Mistrial
made on the fourth day of trial.
5.

The trial court improperly allowed the State to

admit evidence of possession of a firearm by a restricted felon
in the case where the Defendant was never charged with that
7

offense.

Said evidence was admitted

in order to

improperly

prejudice the jury and inflame the jury into imposing the death
penalty.
6.

The

jury

was

improperly

influenced

by

the

appearance of the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, former Judge of the
Fifth District Court, and father to the Iron County Attorney when
Judge Burns appeared during the course of the trial and was
openly seen to consult with and support the State's prosecutor in
this trial.
7.

The prosecutor improperly interposed his personal

opinions in argument to the jury, thereby placing undue emphasis
on his personal perceptions of the case in violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
8.

The Defendant was sentenced to death by a jury

tainted by juror misconduct wherein the juror Mark A. Poulson
engaged in conversation with one of the witnesses called by the
State of Utah.
9.

The Defendant was denied due process of law when

the court refused the Defendant's requested instruction regarding
two

reasonable

theories

of

the

evidence,

one

pointing

to

mitigation, and one pointing to aggravation.
ARGUMENT
I
THE STATUTE OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN CONVICTED,
AFTER HIS GUILTY PLEA, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

8

This

Defendant

plead

guilty

to

76-5-202

(1)

(h)

admitting that he knowingly and intentionally caused the death of
another, after having previously been convicted
involving

the use

or threat or violence to

of a felony

a person.

The

specific felony was an armed robbery in Las Vegas, Nevada, in
November of 1982.
It

is

Parsons1

assertion

that

unconstitutional in two different respects.

the

statute

is

First, the statute

subjects Mr. Parsons to the unconstitutional result of, "for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb11 in
violation

of

Constitution.

the

Fifth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

A similar Utah Constitutional provision states

"nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense."

This appellant acknowledges that the argument may be

made that this subsection of the capital homicide statute may be
seen as similar to the habitual criminal statutes that have
passed constitutional review in the past. STATE V. BAILEY, 712
P. 2d 281

(Utah, 1986)

However, apart from the

substantial

procedural variance between the habitual criminal statute and
76-5-202 (1) (h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

the

appellant urges this Court to rule that by making a homicide,
after having been convicted of a crime of violence against a
person, a capital offense, the legislature has created a new
crime, rather than simply enhancing the punishment of the latest
offense.

The new crime has as its primary element the conviction

and sentencing on a previous crime of violence.
9

Such a pattern

seems directly violative of the Utah Constitution's prohibition
against being
(Article
provisions

1,

"twice put
Section

within

the

12,

in jeopardy

for the

same offense"

Constitution

of

Utah).

The

Fifth Amendment

of

the United

like
States

Constitution, prohibiting any person "for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb", are offended by a statute
which, because

of the elements of the offense, inflict the

ultimate punishment because of a crime already punished.

This is

a process far removed form the enhancement of punishments on the
basis of a defendant's new conduct coupled his prior record.

The

scheme of creating a new offense upon the foundation of an old
one, as in 76-5-202

(1)

(h) , Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as

amended, is constitutionally flawed on double jeopardy grounds.
Mr. Parsons plead guilty to the offense specified in
76-5-202 (1) (h) for the reason that the State could so easily
prove him guilty of that offense.

There was no question that

Mr. Parsons was the person who committed the homicide.
the physical

evidence, as well

as eyewitness

All of

identification

testimony established Mr. Parsons as the individual present at
the scene of the homicide and in possession of the victim's
property after the homicide.

Furthermore, the State had easy

access to certified records of the Nevada conviction, and for
that reason the Defendant determined that it was best to plead
guilty to the statutory provision that was so easily proven.
This was a tactical decision reached by the Defendant and his
counsel under the theory that a psychological momentum would be
10

built up when the jury was presented with the Defendant's record
in the guilt phase

of a trial.

The Defendant, of course,

strenuously objected to the other provisions with which he was
charged, that being that he committed the homicide for pecuniary
gain, or that he committed the homicide in the course of a
robbery.

These items were later used by the State as aggravating

circumstances
Defendant's

in

the

previous

sentencing

provisions,

conviction.

along

However,

with

the

the

Defendant

affirmatively asserts that had he not faced the prospect of a
conviction on an unconstitutional statute, he would never have
been subjected to the death penalty at the sentencing phase.
that reason, the constitutionality

of 76-5-202

(1)

For

(h) is a

threshhold issue in this case.
The

other

unconstitutional
evidence
provisions
Evidence.

that

reason

for

finding

76-5-202

(1)

(h)

is that it allows the State of Utah to use
would

of Rules

otherwise
403

and

404

be

inadmissible

under

the

(b) of the Utah Rules of

Rule 403 prohibits the use of relevant evidence that

may unduly prejudice or confuse or mislead the jury.

Rule 404

(b) states that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, is not
admissible to prove the character of a person or to show that he
acted in conformity therewith.

It is Mr. Parsons' assertion that

this use of prior convictions is in direct violation of the Utah
Rules of Evidence 403 and 404 (b) , and that as such, he was
denied due process of law by use of the unconstitutional statute.

11

In the case of STATE V, SAUNDERS, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah,
1985) this Court stated:
The
basis
of
these
limitations
on
the
admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused
because of bad character rather than because he is
shown to be guilty of the offenses charged. Because of
this tendency, such evidence is presumed prejudicial
and, absent a reason for the admission of the evidence
other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence
is excluded.
This reasoning is, of course, grounded upon the constitutional
right of an accused to receive a fair trial by an impartial jury
with all of the due process of law to which he is entitled.

The

requirements of due process have consistently refuted attempts to
convict a defendant on the basis of his status rather than his
acts.

rUNITED STATES V. FOSKEY, 636 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980);

GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS V. TOTO, 529 F.2d
Cir. 1976);

UNITED

STATES

(D.C. Cir. 1976); UNITED

V. DANIELS,

STATES V. COOK,

770

538

278

F.2d

F.2d

1000

(3rd
1111
(3rd

Cir. 1976)]
II
THE JURY, BY VIRTUE OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, WAS IMPROPERLY MISLEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT
COULD

FIND

ONLY

AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES

AND NO

MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES IN DETERMINING THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
The jury was given specific findings by the court with
regard to the aggravating circumstances present in the case.

The

jury,

the

however,

was

only

generally

instructed

mitigating circumstances in the case (R. 267).
12

regarding

The result of

specific findings versus general instructions made it possible
for the jury to come to only one conclusion, and that is that the
aggravating

circumstances, which had been

specifically

found

by the jury, outweighed any mitigating circumstances for which
there was no specific finding or special verdict form.

The fact

that the jury was out less than four hours in this case would
indicate that the structure of the jury verdicts themselves had
easily mislead the jury to the conclusion that there were only
aggravating circumstances present.
There is no requirement within 76-3-207, Utah Code
Annotated,

1953, as

amended, that

a

jury

be

given

verdicts as to either aggravation or mitigation.

special

The holding in

STATE V. WOOD, 648 P. 2d 71 (Utah, 1981) included an admonition
that the sentencing authority consider aggravating and mitigating
factors not in terms of relative numbers, but in terms of their
respective substantiality and persuasiveness.
in this case

Instruction No. 12

(R. 2 65) contained this language.

However, the

special verdicts which related solely to the aggravating factors,
gave the impression not only of the importance of these factors
in terms of numbers, but also in terms of substantiality and
persuasiveness.

If the jury should not consider the aggravating

factors as substantial and persuasive, then why would the trial
court ask the jury

for special

findings on the

factors and ignore the mitigating ones?

aggravating

In general the law is

opposed to special verdicts in criminal cases [76 AM. JUR. 2d
TRIAL Sec. 1178; STATE V BOCK, 328 P.2d 1065
13

(Idaho)].

This

appellant would urge the Court to adopt a rule that would require
either no special verdicts in capital sentencing proceedings or
at

least

a

balance

of

potential

special

verdicts

to

be

considered.
Ill
THE DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE TO THE COURT THAT HE WAS BEING CHARGED WITH A
FIRST DEGREE MURDER CASE IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER.
It is Mr. Parsons1 assertion that in his particular
case the only reason he was charged with First Degree Murder
instead of Second Degree Murder was because of the arbitrary and
capricious decision of the State of Utah

to charge his as a

capital case when others were not so charged.

The undersigned

counsel for Mr. Parsons has been in practice in the Southern Utah
area for 13 years.

Of that 13 years, the undersigned spent 4

years as the Iron County Attorney and the remaining time as a
member of the criminal defense bar.
undersigned

has

found

In that 13 years period, the

that only Mr. Parsons, of all

of the

homicide cases in the Southern Utah area where the defendant was
the actual perpetrator of the offense, was faced with the death
penalty.
fully

Only one other case, State v. Norman Lee Newstead, was

tried,

both

in

the

guilt

and

penalty

Mr. Newstead did not receive the death penalty.

phases,

and

In all other

approximately 8 homicide cases that arguably could have been
tried as First Degree Murder cases, the Defendant faced only
Second

Degree

Murder

charges.
14

However,

Mr. Parsons

was

prohibited the ability to even make a record regarding this
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in his case.
In the trial court the State asserted, and the court
agreed, that the Appellant's request to hold a hearing to present
and preserve evidence regarding the charging and prosecution of
other capital cases in the Southern Utah area in the last ten
years amounted to a "proportionality" hearing of the type denied
in PULLY V, HARRIS, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
re-asserts

his

claim

that

he

is

However, the appellant

entitled

to

examine

the

application of the death penalty, at least in Southern Utah, at
the trial court, in order to support his claim that the death
penalty has been "wantonly or freakishly" imposed. (See PULLY,
supra.)
IV
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INTERVENED IN THE PROCEEDING
BY ASSISTING THE STATE WHEN THE COUNTY ATTORNEY MADE A MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL.
On the fourth day of trial at the matter, after the
testimony of Dr. Robert Howell, the County Attorney moved the
court for a mistrial.

The court advised the County Attorney that

should he move for a mistrial at that stage in the proceedings,
that he could never bring the matter back for trial should the
Motion be granted.

After the court's admonition, the County

Attorney then withdrew that Motion and the matter proceeded
forward.
improperly

It

is Mr. Parsons1

instructed

the

position

County
15

that

Attorney's

the

trial

office

at

court
this

point.

The transcript, at Pages 1168 through 1169, reads as

follows:
THE COURT: All right.
have now left the room.

The members of the jury

Mr. Burns.
MR. BURNS: Yes, Your Honor. The State at this
time would like to move for a mistrial based upon —
THE COURT:
for a mistrial?

Mr. Burns, are you —

you want to move

MR. BURNS: I want to move for a mistrial on the
following basis.
THE COURT:
minute, please.

May I speak to you at the bench a

(Whereupon, a discussion was had among court and
counsel at the bench, which was reported as
follows:)
THE COURT: The law says that if you move for a
mistrial, that that invokes the double jeopardy
standard, and he can't be retried.
MR. BURNS: Well, if I move for a mistrial — I
have a right to move for a mistrial if I want to if
defense counsel misrepresents something.
I have the right to have a psychologist here
present, and I don't because —
THE COURT: Well, you should have raised it before
You should have had your psychologist here.
MR. BURNS:
I have raised it.
I'll make my
record.

now.

THE COURT:

I wouldn't move for a mistrial.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in
open court, outside the hearing and the presence
of the jury.)
MR. BURNS: Based upon the court's feeling with
respect to the bodies of law in the State of Utah and
the State moving for a mistrial, I'll withdraw that.
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Following this interchange, the State complained about
the

substance

of

Dr. Howell's

testimony

and

the

earlier

conversation had in chambers on the second day of trial regarding
the issue of whether or not Dr. Howell would be called by the
defense.

The court, after having reviewed the record, determined

that the County Attorney had been advised as to the substance of
Dr. Howell's testimony and that no misrepresentations were made
between

what

the

County

Dr. Howell had testified.
brief

Attorney

had

been

told

and

what

It was apparent to the writer of this

(who was also defense counsel at trial) that following

Dr. Howell's testimony the County Attorney became very concerned
about the substance of that testimony and the effect that it
might have had upon the jury.

The County Attorney at that time

determined that he would move for a mistrial, which motion, if
granted, would have had the effect of imposing a sentence of life
imprisonment upon the Defendant.
It is the position of the Defendant that the court
improperly intervened in behalf of the State of Utah at this time
and gave the County Attorney advice from the bench to which the
County Attorney was not entitled.

It is difficult

for this

Defendant to see this action by the court as harmless error,
since

if the court had

not

advised the County

Attorney

to

withdraw the motion for mistrial, Mr. Parsons would have received
a sentence of life imprisonment.
This writer has been unable to locate any Utah case law
or statutory authority on this point, but it would seem that the
17

Appellant should be entitled to a proceeding where the prosecutor
is not coached by the presiding judge.
V
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE STATE TO ADMIT
EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER INFLAMMATORY CRIME OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS
NEVER CHARGED.
The trial court in construing this courtfs ruling in
STATE V. LAFFERTY, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah, 1988), allowed the State
to

present

evidence

of

a

non-violent

crime

for

which

the

Defendant had not been charged and of which the Defendant had not
been convicted.

The court did require that the jury find the

evidence of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt, but the trial
court misconstrued

LAFFERTY to say that the State could use

evidence of any crime uncharged and unproven so long as the jury
was instructed beyond a reasonable doubt.

LAFFERTY does not

extend that far and this Defendant is unduly prejudiced by such
an extension.
This Defendant

is also prejudiced by this practice

advocated in LAFFERTY in violation of Section 13 of Article I of
the Utah State Constitution.
Constitution

requires

that

This provision of the Utah State
the

Defendant

be

prosecuted

by

"information after examination and commitment by a magistrate".
This Defendant was denied this opportunity when this evidence was
first presented at the sentencing phase of his prosecution for a
capital homicide charge.

The Defendant was also denied his right

under Section 12 of Article I of the Utah Constitution to have a
18

copy of the accusation against him, and his right under Section 7
of Article I of the Utah State Constitution to have due process
of law.

The Court's attention is drawn to the dissenting opinion

by Associate Chief Justice Stewart in STATE V. LAFFERTY stating
"I believe the better course is to completely exclude evidence of
crimes for which there is no conviction."
VI
THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INFLUENCED BY THE APPEARANCE OF
THE HONORABLE J. HARLAN BURNS, FORMER JUDGE OF THE FIFTH DISTRICT
COURT AND FATHER TO THE IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY, WHEN JUDGE BURNS
APPEARED IN OPEN COURT DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL AND WAS
SEEN TO CONSULT WITH AND ADVISE THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR IN THIS
ACTION.
The foreman of this jury, Mr. Clemont B. Adams, was
formerly the principal of the South Elementary School in Cedar
City, Utah

(T. 21) .

By unusual

happenstance, Mr. Adams was

principal of the South Elementary School when the writer of this
brief and the Iron County Attorney, Scott M. Burns, both attended
that school.

These facts are not in the record, but they are

represented to the Court by the writer of this brief, as an
officer of this Court, to be true.

The undersigned was also

present in the Fifth District Court of Iron County when the
Honorable J. Harlan Burns presided in that Court.
B. Adams

appeared

as

a

witness

in

another

Mr. Clemont

matter.

The

undersigned was present when Judge Burns complimented Mr. Adams
for his having been able to preside over a school in which all
19

four of Judge Burns1 sons had attended.

Judge Burns retired from

the bench in January of 1987, but still remained a respected
member of the Cedar City community and the Southern Utah area.
He appeared during the trial in this matter and sat in the
courtroom watching the proceedings for a short period of time,
perhaps one to two hours.
acknowledged

by

Judge

The presence of Judge Burns was

Eves

on

the

record

(T. 1060).

This

is such an extraordinary circumstance that the undersigned is
unaware of, and has been unable to find, any parallel cases where
the

former

Judge

of

a

court, and

also

the

father

of

the

prosecutor, appeared in court, obviously with interest in his
son's work and

seemingly

in an advisory

capacity.

This is

additionally unusual in that the foreman of the jury was a school
principal of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel, and
well-acquainted

with

both

attorneys, as well

as

the

former

District Judge.

The writer of this brief is aware of no specific

instance of prejudice against this Defendant or bias in favor
of the State because of the presence of Judge Burns in this
trial.
gravity

However, the circumstances are so extraordinary and the
of this case so extreme, that this writer

feels it

necessary to point out this occurrence to this reviewing Court.
VII
THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY IMPLIED PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF
THE

FACTS

IN

ISSUE

BY

PLACING

INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE.
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UNDUE

EMPHASIS

ON

HIS

In closing argument, the County Attorney was arguing
that the victim was not a homosexual and that the Defendant's
story

of

having

believable.

his

leg

touched

by

the

victim

was

not

At that point, the County Attorney said:

Let's just say for the sake of argument — let's
throw all that out. Let's say he did. I don't think
you believe that, and I don't think you'll find that,
but let's just say —
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, I must object at this
point. The counsel is referring to his own opinion and
what he thinks happened in the matter. It is improper
under Rule 3.4 of the Rules of —
THE COURT: I think he was drawing a permissible
deduction from the evidence. (T. 1219)
The writer of this brief understands that both sides
have considerable latitude in their closing arguments and that
they are entitled to draw fair deductions and inferences from the
evidence. (STATE

V. LAFFERTY,

supra.)

However,

a

prosecutor

steps across that line of drawing reasonable deductions into the
prohibited area of asserting personal knowledge when he says "I
don't think you'll find that".
unchecked

testimony

and

Such a statement gives unsworn,

exploits

the

influence

of

the

Prosecutor's office, in exactly the fashion decried in the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, Section 3-5.8

(2d Ed. 1980).

[Also see Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4 (e)]
VIII
THE DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH BY A JURY, ONE OF
WHOSE MEMBERS HAD SPOKEN WITH ONE OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES IN THE
FOYER OF THE COURTROOM DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL.
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The transcript of the proceedings from Page 814 through
Page 823 relates the occurrences between Mr. Slater, the State's
witness, and Mark Andrew Poulson.

The time of the conversation,

was Wednesday, January 27, 1988, between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m.

The

Defendant felt comfortable with Mr. Poulson seated on the jury
and

felt

comfortable

with

conversation with Mr. Slater.
any

prejudice

resulting

Mr. Poulson's

relation

of

his

The Defendant specifically waived
from

the

conversation

juror Poulson and the witness, Slater. (T. 823)

between

However, at the

return of a verdict for the death penalty, the Defendant must
conclude that the contact between the witness and the juror was
prejudicial.

The standard for review in capital cases is that

this court will review errors raised on appeal even if no proper
objection was made at trial, but will reverse a conviction based
on such errors only if they are manifest and prejudicial, fSTATE
V. LAFFERTY 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah, 1988)]

The court, of course,

must determine whether or not the error was prejudicial, and in
making that determination must find that there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the Defendant.

In

this case, where the jury considered three days of testimony and
over 100 exhibits and arrived at a verdict imposing the death
penalty after only three and one-half hours, there would appear
to be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
Defendant absent the error.
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IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY,
AS DEFENDANT REQUESTED, ON THE TWO REASONABLE HYPOTHESES THEORY.
The Defendant submitted to the trial court a request
jury instruction asking the jury to be instructed that if they
could view the evidence in two reasonable interpretations, one in
favor of aggravation, and the other in favor of mitigation, that
they

are

required

(R. 211-212).

to

adopt

the

mitigating

interpretation

The court refused to give such an instruction and

rested its decision on earlier cases in the State of Utah denying
such instructions in guilt or innocence phases of felony trials
(T. 1198).

The case of STATE V. LAROCCO, 664 P.2d 1272 (Utah,

1982) , was relied upon by the court in determining that the two
reasonable hypotheses instruction is given within the discretion
of the court and is not even required in cases where evidence is
solely circumstantial.

However, in cases such as this, where the

death penalty is imposed and the circumstance of the death are
essential to the determination by the jury of the character of
the accused in determining penalty, the two reasonable hypotheses
instruction should be mandated in order to give the jury guidance
in the interpretation of physical evidence which can only be
deemed as circumstantial.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant's sentence to death should be overturned
and the court should follow the legislative mandate in 76-3-207
(5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and order that the
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court

sentence

the

Defendant

to

life

imprisonment.

In

the

alternative, the court should allow the Defendant to withdraw his
plea of guilty to the unconstitutional statute and remand the
matter for new trial in the District Court.
DATED this

</

day of August, 1988
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